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Abstract. Software reliability models are an important tool in quality
management and release planning. There is a large number of different
models that often exhibit strengths in different areas. This paper pro-
poses a model that is based on a geometric sequence (or progression) of
the failure rates of faults. This property of the failure process was ob-
served in practice at Siemens among others and led to the development
of the proposed model. It is described in detail and evaluated using stan-
dard criteria. Most importantly, the model performs constantly well over
several projects in terms of its predictive validity.
1 Introduction
Software reliability engineering is an established area of software engineering
research and practice that is concerned with the improvement and measurement
of reliability. For the analysis typically stochastic software reliability models are
used. They model the failure process of the software and use other software
metrics or failure data as a basis for parameter estimation. The models are able
(1) to estimate the current reliability and (2) to predict future failure behaviour.
There are already several established models. The most important ones has
been classified by Miller as exponential order statistic (EOS) models in [5]. He
divided the models on the highest level into deterministic and doubly stochastic
EOS models arguing that the failure rates either have a deterministic relationship
or are again randomly distributed. For the deterministic models, Miller presented
several interesting special cases. The well-known Jelinski-Moranda model [3], for
example, has constant rates. He also stated that geometric rates are possible as
documented by Nagel [9, 8].
This geometric sequence (or progression) between failure rates of faults was
also observed in projects of the communication networks department of the
Siemens AG. In several older projects which were analysed, this relationship
fitted well to the data. Therefore, a software reliability model based on a geo-
metric sequence of failure rates is proposed.
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Problem. The problem which software reliability engineering still faces is the
need for accurate models for different environments and projects. Detailed mod-
els with a geometric sequence of failure rates have to our knowledge not been
proposed so far.
Contribution. We describe a detailed and practical software reliability model
that was motivated out of practical experience and contains a geometric sequence
of failure rates which was also suggested by theoretical results. A detailed com-
parison shows that this model has a constantly good performance over several
projects, although other models perform better in specific projects. Hence, we
validated the general assumption that a geometric sequence of failure rates is a
reasonable model for software.
Outline. We first describe important aspects of the model in Sec. 2. In Sec. 3 the
model is evaluated using several defined criteria, most importantly its predictive
validity in comparison with established models. We offer final conclusions in
Sec. 4. Related work is cited where appropriate.
2 Model Description
The core of the proposed model is a geometric sequence for the failure rates
of the faults. This section describes this and other assumptions in more detail,
introduces the main equations and the time component of the model and gives
an example of how the parameters of the model can be estimated.
2.1 Assumptions
The main theory behind this model is the ordering of the faults that are present
in the software based on their failure rates. The term failure rate describes in
this context the probability that an existing fault will result in an erroneous
behaviour of the system during a defined time slot or while executing an average
operation. In essence, we assign each fault a time-dependent probability of fail-
ure and combine those probabilities to the total failure intensity. The ordering
implies that the fault with the highest probability of triggering a failure comes
first, then the fault with the second highest probability and so on. The probabil-
ities are then arranged on a logarithmic scale to attain an uniform distribution
of the points on the x-axis. The underlying assumption being that there are
numerous faults with low failure rates and only a small number of faults with
high failure rates. In principle, we assume an infinite number of faults because
of imperfect debugging and updates.
As mentioned above, the logarithmic scale distributes the data points in
approximately the same distance from each other. Therefore, this distance is
approximated by a constant factor between the probabilities. Then we can use
the following geometric sequence (or progression) for the calculation of the failure
rates:
pn = p1 · d(n−1), (1)
where pn is the failure rate of the n-th fault, p1 the failure rate of the first fault,
and d is a project-specific parameter. It is assumed that d is an indicator for the
complexity of a system that may be related to the number of different branches
in a program. In past projects of Siemens d was calculated to be between 0.92
and 0.96. The parameter d is multiplied and not added because the distance is
only constant on a logarithmic scale.
The failure occurrence of a fault is assumed to be geometrically distributed.
Therefore, the probability that a specific fault occurred by time t is the following:
P (Ta ≤ t) = Fa(t) = 1− (1− pa)t. (2)
We denote with Ta the random variable of the failure time of the fault a.
In summary, the model can be described as the sum of an infinite number of
geometrically distributed random variables with different parameters which in
turn are described by a geometric sequence.
2.2 Equations
The two equations that are typically used to describe a software reliability model
are the mean number of failures µ(t) and the failure intensity λ(t). The mean
value function needs to consider the expected value over the indicator functions
of the faults:
µ(t) = E(N(t))
= E
(∑∞
i=a I[0,t](Xa)
)
=
∑∞
a=1E(I[0,t](Xa))
=
∑∞
a=1 P (Xa ≤ t)
=
∑∞
a=1 1− (1− pa)t.
(3)
This gives us a typical distribution as depicted in Fig. 1. Note that the
distribution is actually discrete which is not explicitly shown because of the
high values used on the x-axis.
We cannot differentiate the mean value equation directly to get the failure
intensity. However, we can use the probability density function (pdf) of the
geometric distribution to derive this equation. The pdf of a single fault is
f(t) = pa(1− pa)t−1. (4)
Therefore, to get the number of failures that occur at a certain point in time t,
we have to sum up the pdf’s of all the faults:
λ(t) =
∞∑
a=1
pa(1− pa)t−1. (5)
An interesting quantity is typically the time that is needed to reach a cer-
tain reliability level. Based on the failure intensity objective that is anticipated
for the release, this can be derived using the equation for the failure intensity.
Rearranging Eq. 4 gives:
t =
lnλ∑∞
a=1 pa − p2a
+ 1. (6)
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Fig. 1. A typical distribution of the model
What we need, however, is the further required time ∆t to determine the nec-
essary length of the test or field trial. We denote the failure intensity objective
λF and use the following equation to determine ∆t:
∆t = tF − t = lnλF − lnλ∑∞
a=1 pa − p2a
(7)
Finally, the result needs to be converted into calendar time to be able to give a
date for the end of the test or field trial.
2.3 Time Component
In the proposed model time is measured in incidents, each representing a usage
task of the system. To convert these incidents into calendar time it is necessary
to introduce an explicit time component. This contains explicit means to convert
from one time format into another.
There are several possibilities to handle time in reliability models. The prefer-
able is to use execution time directly. This, however, is often not possible. Subse-
quently, a suitable substitute must be found. With respect to testing this could
be the number of test cases, for the field use the number of clients and so forth.
Fig. 2 shows the relationships between different possible time types.
The first possibility is to use in-service time as a substitute. This requires
knowledge of the number of users and the average usage time per user. Then
the question arises how this relates to the test cases in system testing. A first
approximation is the average duration of a test case. The number of incidents is,
opposed to the in-service time, a more task-oriented way to measure time. The
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Fig. 2. The possible relationships between different types of time
main advantage of using incidents, apart from the fact that they are already in
use at Siemens, is that in this way, we can obtain very intuitive metrics, e.g.,
the average number of failures per incident. There are usually some estimations
of the number of incidents per client and data about the number of sold client
licenses.
However, the question of the relation to test cases is also open. A first cut
would be to assume a test case is equal to an incident. A test case, however, has
more “time value” than one incident because it is generally directed testing, i.e.,
cases with a high probability of failure are preferred. In addition, a test case is
usually unique in function or parameter set while the normal use of a product
often consists of similar actions. When we do not follow the operational profile
this should be accounted for. A possible extension of the model is proposed in
[12] but needs further investigation.
2.4 Parameter Estimation
There are two techniques for parameter determination currently in use. The
first is prediction based on data from similar projects. This is useful for planing
purposes before failure data is available.
However, estimations should also be made during test, field trial, and op-
eration based on the sample data available so far. This is the approach most
reliability models use and it is also statistically most advisable since the sample
data comes from the population we actually want to analyse. Techniques such
as Maximum Likelihood estimation or Least Squares estimation are used to fit
the model to the actual data.
Maximum Likelihood. The Maximum Likelihood method essentially uses a like-
lihood function that describes the probability of a certain number of failures
occurring up to a certain time. This function is filled with sample data and then
optimised to find the parameters with the maximum likelihood.
The problem with this is that the likelihood function of this model gets ex-
tremely complicated. Essentially, we have an infinite number of random variables
that are geometrically distributed, but all with different parameter p. Even if
we constrain ourselves to a high number N of variables under consideration it
still results in a sum of
(
N
x
)
different products. This requires to sum up every
possible permutation in which x failures have occurred up to time t. The number
of possibilities is
(
N
x
)
. Each summand is a product of a permutation in which
different faults resulted in failures.
L(p1, d) =
∏x
i=1 1− (1− pi)t ·
∏N
i=x+1 (1− pi)t+∏x+1
i=2 1− (1− pi)t ·
∏N
i=x+2 (1− pi)t · (1− p1)t+∏x+2
i=3 1− (1− pi)t ·
∏N
i=x+3 (1− pi)t ·
∏2
i=1 (1− p1)t+
. . . ,
(8)
where pi = p1d
i−1.
An efficient method to maximise this function has not been found.
Least Squares. For the Least Squares method an estimate of the failure intensity
is used and the relative error to the estimated failure intensity from the model is
minimised. We use the estimate of the mean number of failures for this because it
is the original part of the model. Therefore, the square function to be minimised
in our case can be written as follows:
S(p1, d) =
m∑
j=1
[ln rj − lnµ(tj ; p1, d)]2, (9)
where m is the number of measurement points, rj is the measured value for the
cumulated failures, and tj is the time at measurement j.
This function is minimised using the simplex variant of Nelder and Mead
[10]. We found this method to be usable for our purpose.
3 Evaluation
We describe several criteria that are used to assess the proposed model.
3.1 Criteria
The criteria that we use for the evaluation of the Fischer-Wagner model are
derived from Musa et al. [6]. We assess according to five criteria, four of which
can mainly be applied theoretically, whereas one criterion is based on practical
applications of the models on real data. The first criterion is the capability of the
model. It describes whether the model is able to yield important quantities. The
criterion quality of assumptions is used to assess the plausibility of the assump-
tions behind the model. The cases in which the model can be used are evaluated
with the criterion applicability. Furthermore, simplicity is an important aspect
for the understandability of the model. Finally, the predictive validity is assessed
by applying the model to real failure data and comparing the deviation.
3.2 Capability
The main purpose of a reliability model is to aid managers and engineers in
planning and managing software projects by estimating useful quantities about
the software reliability and the reliability growth. Following [6] such quantities,
in approximate order of importance, are
1. current reliability,
2. expected date of reaching a specified reliability,
3. human and computer resource and cost requirements related to the achieve-
ment of the objective.
Furthermore, it is a valuable part of a reliability model if it can predict
quantities early in the development based on software metrics and/or historical
project data.
The model yields the current reliability as current failure intensity and mean
number of failures. It is also able to give predictions based on parameters from
historical data. Furthermore, the expected date of reaching a specified reliability
can be calculated. Human and computer resources are not explicitly incorpo-
rated. There is an explicit concept of time but, it is not as sophisticated as, for
example, in the Musa-Okumoto model [7].
3.3 Quality of Assumptions
As far as possible, each assumption should be tested by real data. At least
it should be possible to argue for the plausibility of the assumption based on
theoretical knowledge and experience. Also the clarity and explicitness of the
assumptions are important.
The main assumption in the proposed model is that the failure rates of the
faults follow a geometric sequence. The intuition is that there are many faults
with low failure rates and only a small number of faults with high failure rates.
This is in accordance with software engineering experience and supported by [1].
Moreover, the geometric sequence as relationship between different faults has
been documented in a NASA study [9, 8].
Furthermore, an assumption is that the occurrence of a failure is geometri-
cally distributed. The geometric distribution fits because it can describe inde-
pendent events. We do not consider continuous time but discrete incidents.
Finally, the infinite number of faults makes sense when considering imperfect
debugging, i.e., fault removal can introduce new faults or the old faults are not
completely removed.
3.4 Applicability
It is important for a general reliability model to be applicable to software prod-
ucts in different domains and of different size. Also varying project environments
or life cycle phases should be feasible. There are four special situations identified
in [6] that should be possible to handle.
1. Software evolution
2. Classification of severity of failures into different categories
3. Ability to handle incomplete failure data with measurement uncertainties
4. Operation of the same program on computers of different performance
All real applications of the proposed model have been in the telecommunica-
tions area. However, it was used for software of various sizes and complexities.
Moreover, during the evaluation of the predictive validity we applied it also to
other domains (see Sec. 3.6). In principle, the model can be used before and
during the field trial. Software evolution is hence not explicitly incorporated. A
classification of failures is possible but has not been used so far. Moreover, the
performance of computers is not a strong issue in this domain.
3.5 Simplicity
A model should be simple enough to be usable in real project environments: it
has to be simple to collect the necessary data, easy to understand the concepts
and assumptions, and the model should be implementable in a tool.
While the concepts themselves are not difficult to understand, the model in
total is rather complicated because it not only involves failures but also faults.
Furthermore, for all these faults the failure is geometrically distributed but each
with a different probability.
A main criticism is also that the assumed infinite number of faults make
the model difficult to handle. In practical applications of the model and when
building a tool, an upper bound of the number of faults must be introduced to be
able to calculate model values. This actually introduces a third model parameter
in some sense.
The two parameters, however, can be interpreted as direct measures of the
software. The parameter p1 is the failure probability of the most probable fault
and d can be seen as a measure of system complexity.
3.6 Predictive Validity
The most important and “hardest” criterion for the evaluation of a reliability
model is its predictive validity. A model has to be a faithful abstraction of the
real failure process of the software and give valid estimations and predictions
of the reliability. For this we follow again [6] and use the number of failures
approach.
Approach. We assume that there have been q failures observed at the end
of test time (or field trial time) tq. We use the failure data up to te(≤ tq) to
estimate the parameters of the mean number of failures µ(t). The substitution
of the estimates of the parameters yields the estimate of the number of failures
µˆ(tq). The estimate is compared with the actual number at q. This procedure is
repeated with several tes.
For a comparison we can plot the relative error (µˆ(tq) − q)/q against the
normalised test time te/tq. The error will approach 0 as te approaches tq. If the
points are positive, the model tends to overestimate and accordingly underes-
timate if the points are negative. Numbers closer to 0 imply a more accurate
prediction and, hence, a better model.
Models for Comparison. As comparison models we apply four well-known
models: Musa basic, Musa-Okumoto, Littlewood-Verall, and NHPP. All these
models are implemented in the tool SMERFS [2] that was used to calculate the
necessary predictions. We describe each model in more detail in the following.
Musa basic. The Musa basic execution time model assumes that all faults are
equally likely to occur, are independent of each other and are actually observed.
The execution times between failures are modelled as piecewise exponentially
distributed. The intensity function is proportional to the number of faults re-
maining in the program and the fault correction rate is proportional to the failure
occurrence rate.
Musa-Okumoto. The Musa-Okumoto model, also called logarithmic Poisson ex-
ecution time model, was first described in [7]. It also assumes that all faults are
equally likely to occur and are independent of each other. The expected number
of faults is a logarithmic function of time in this model, and the failure inten-
sity decreases exponentially with the expected failures experienced. Finally, the
software will experience an infinite number of failures in infinite time.
Littlewood-Verall Bayesian. This model was proposed for the first time in [4].
The assumptions of the Littlewood-Verall Bayesian model are that successive
times between failures are independent random variables each having an expo-
nential distribution. The distribution for the i-th failure has a mean of 1/λ(i).
The λ(i)s form a sequence of independent variables, each having a gamma dis-
tribution with the parameters α and φ(i). φ(i) has either the form: β(0)+β(1) · i
(linear) or β(0) + β(1) · i2 (quadratic). We used the quadratic version of the
model.
NHPP. Various models based on a non-homogeneous Poisson process are de-
scribed in [11]. The particular model used also assumes that all faults are equally
likely to occur and are independent of each other. The cumulative number of
faults detected at any time follows a Poisson distribution with mean m(t). That
mean is such that the expected number of faults in any small time interval
about t is proportional to the number of undetected faults at time t. The mean
is assumed to be a bounded non-decreasing function with m(t) approaching the
expected total number of faults to be detected as the length of testing goes to
infinity. It is possible to use NHPP on time-between-failure data as well as failure
counts. We used the time-between-failure version in our evaluation.
Data Sets. We apply the reliability models to several different sets of data
to compare the predictive validity. The detailed results for all of these projects
can be found in [12]. We describe only the combined results in the following.
The used data sets come (1) from the The Data & Analysis Center for Software
(DACS) of the US-American Department of Defence and (2) from the telecom-
munication department of Siemens. The DACS data has already been used in
several evaluations of software reliability models. Hence, this ensures the com-
parability of our results. In particular, we used the projects 1, 6, and 40 and
their failure data from system tests measured in execution time.
The Siemens data gives additional insights and analysis of the applicability of
the model to these kind of projects. We mainly analyse two data sets containing
the failure data from the field trial of telecommunication software and a web
application. The Siemens data contains no execution time but calendar time
can be used as approximation because of constant usage during field trial. All
these projects come from different domains with various sizes and requirements
to ensure a representative evaluation.
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Fig. 3. Median relative errors for the different models based on all analysed data sets
Analysis and Interpretation. The usage of the number of failures approach
for each project resulted in different curves for the predictive validity over time.
For a better general comparison we combined the data into one plot which can
be found in Fig. 3. This combination is straight-forward as we only considered
relative time and relative errors. To avoid that strongly positive and strongly neg-
ative values combined give very small errors we use medians instead of average
values. The plot shows that with regard to the analysed projects the Littlewood-
Verall model gives very accurate predictions, also the NHPP and the proposed
model are strong from early on.
However, for an accurate interpretation we have to note that the data of the
Littlewood-Verall model for one of the Siemens projects was not incorporated
into this comparison because its predictions were far off with a relative error
of about 6. Therefore, the model has an extremely good predictive validity if it
gives reasonable results but unacceptable predictions for some projects. A similar
argument can be made for the NHPP model which made the weakest predictions
for one of the DACS projects. The proposed model cannot reach the validity of
these models for particular projects, but has a more constant performance over
all projects. This is important because it is difficult to determine which of the
models gives accurate predictions in the early stages of application since there is
only a small amount of data. Using the Littlewood-Verall or NHPP model could
lead to extremely bad predictions in some cases.
4 Conclusions
We conclude with a summary of our investigations and give some directions for
future work.
Summary. We propose a software reliability model that is based on a geometric
series of the failure rates of faults. This basis is suggested from the theory by
Miller in [5] as well as from practice in Nagel et al. in [9, 8] and Siemens projects.
The model has a state-of-the-art parameter determination approach and a
corresponding prototype implementation of it. Several data sets from DACS and
Siemens are used to evaluate the predictive validity of the model in comparison
to well-established models. We find that the proposed model often has a similar
predictive validity as the comparison models and outperforms most of them.
However, there is always one of the models that performs better than ours.
Nevertheless, we are able to validate the assumption that a geometric sequence
of failure rates of faults is a reasonable model for software reliability.
Future Work. The early estimation of the model parameters is always a prob-
lem in reliability modelling. Therefore, we plan to evaluate the correlation with
other system parameters. For example the parameter d of the model is supposed
to represent the complexity of the system. Therefore, one or more complexity
metrics of the software code could be used for early prediction. This needs ex-
tensive empirical analysis but could improve the estimation in the early phases
significantly.
Furthermore, a time component that also takes uncertainty into account
would be most accurate. The Musa basic and Musa-Okumoto models were given
such components (see [6]). They model the usage as a random process and give
estimates about the corresponding calendar time to an execution time.
Further applications with other data sets and comparison with other types
of prediction techniques, such as neural networks, are necessary to evaluate the
general applicability and predictive validity of the proposed model.
Finally, we plan to use the model in an economics models for software quality
[13] and work further on a possibility to estimate the test efficiency using the
proposed model. Some early ideas are presented in [12].
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